…Being Continually in Apprehension of an Attack from the Indians…  Tampa Bay in Early 1836 by Gibson, Pamela N. & Knetsch, Joe
Sunland Tribune
Volume 29 Article 8
2018
"…Being Continually in Apprehension of an
Attack from the Indians…" Tampa Bay in Early
1836
Pamela N. Gibson
Joe Knetsch
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/sunlandtribune
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sunland Tribune by an authorized
editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gibson, Pamela N. and Knetsch, Joe (2018) ""…Being Continually in Apprehension of an Attack from the Indians…" Tampa Bay in
Early 1836," Sunland Tribune: Vol. 29 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/sunlandtribune/vol29/iss1/8
'' ... being continually in 
apprehension of an attack 
from the Indians ... ": 
Tampa Bay In Early 1836 
.... 
..... 
........ 
.............. 
0. ..... 
Drawing of Fort Brooke, ca. 1825, showing 
the L. Sutler, K. Bakehouse, and I. Public 
Storehouse located along the Hillsborough 
River. (Courtesy of the P.K. Youn,ge Library 
of Florida History, Special Collections, 
Smathers Libraries, UnitJeTsity of Florida.) 
Pamela N. Gibson and Joe Knetsch, Ph.D. 
n January 4, 1836, the young 
Second Lieutenant Benjamin 
Alvord of the Fourth Infantry 
wrote to the Quartermaster 
General of the United States Anny, General 
Thomas Jesup, that the Schooner Motto 
had just left the post for New Orleans. Its 
mission was to obtain ammunition for the 
recently arrived pair of twelve pounders 
and the small arms then in Fort Brooke. 
Alvord then added the telling portion: " ... 
being continually in apprehension of an 
attack from the Indians the commanding 
officer decides that these materials Furni-
ture &c of Motto cannot be turned over (as 
no officer can properly leave his command) 
... "I Three days prior to this the new com-
mander of the post, Captain Francis S. 
Belton of Maryland, commented that the 
defenses of Fort Brooke were recently 
extended and strengthened and that the 
original cantonment had been entirely 
abandoned. The women and children of the 
casualties of Dade's recent battle were 
shipped off to New Orleans. Brevet Major 
John Mountfort, another recent arrival, also 
noted the improvement of the defensive 
works which now included a trench, new 
pickets and blockhouses. The total regular 
force available to defend the new works and 
the remains of the nearby village were one 
hundred and eighty men and officers plus a 
party of citizen rangers numbering about 
thirty. One hundred friendly Indians were 
encamped outside of the works and 
declared their readiness to fight their 
brethren.2 Quoting a letter from "a 
gentleman attached to Major Mountfort's 
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command," the National Intelligencer 
allowed the author to declare: "Through the 
interposition of Providence, I am now alive 
to let you know it. We are really in the the-
ater of war of the most horrible kind." This 
same writer was one of the lucky ones 
scheduled to ride out and overtake Dade's 
command and join in the march to Fort 
King. His group was delayed long enough to 
meet the three survivors, "horribly man-
gled" who gave them the news of Dade's 
demise.3 
Fort Brooke, on that terrible day, was 
totally isolated and with-
out means of defense 
council. When the U.S. government agent 
did not get the answers or lands demanded, 
he often recommended that the govern-
ment ignore that "chief'' and deal only with 
someone more pliable. That person would 
then be recognized as "chief'' and new ne-
gotiations would be conducted until the de-
sired result was reached. The tribal council 
was totally ignored. The clan system upon 
which much of the political power within 
the Native cultures worked was also 
brushed aside as so much poppycock. The 
government and its agents were ethnocen-
tric to the extreme. 
against a massed attack 
by the Seminoles and 
their allies. The Decem-
ber 28, 1835 battle had 
cost the command at 
Fort Brooke one hundred 
and twelve men and left 
only the sparse garrison 
described above. The fort 
had been strengthened 
but the outlying build-
ings of the nascent village 
had been destroyed, "in 
order to afford no cover 
by which the approach of 
the foe might be facilitat-
ed." Like their colleagues 
in Key West they had 
cleared a field of fire 
and gave the enemy no 
chance of surprise at-
" all the Plantations 
Within this very simpli-
fied scheme no mean-
ingful treaty could ever 
be agreed to and under-
stood. 
South of Tampa were 
destroyed. . . . They ha'Ve 
raised the Tomahawk in 
despair, they are waging 
The Second Semi-
nole War was, in many 
ways, a continuation of 
the First Seminole War 
and the internecine 
warfare that followed. 
The final Indian Agent 
before the war, Wiley 
Thompson, continued 
the government's poli-
cies and attempted to 
get the Seminoles to 
emigrate from Florida 
to Indian Territory west 
of the Mississippi River. 
Thompson's manner 
a war of extermination 
and the Safety of our 
fellow citizens requires 
that not a moment 
should be lost in carrying 
the war into their own 
country." 
Letter from General Richard Keith Call, Florida 
Militia, to Florida Territorial 
Governor John Eaton, January 7, 1836 
tack. 4 The news did not improve with the 
knowledge of the defeat of the force under 
General Duncan L. Clinch at the Withla-
coochee River on December 31, 1835. There 
would be no immediate relief by land. 
What brought on this isolation, fear and 
imminent threat of death? One of the major 
causes of the Second Seminole War (1835-
1842) was the constant and consistent lack 
of understanding between two differing 
cultures; one European, the other Native 
American. The government of the United 
States refused to listen to those who knew 
the Native American culture best and in-
sisted upon discussing issues and signing 
treaties with "the chief'' of the tribe. It sim-
ply ignored the advice that Creek, Seminole 
and Miccosukee culture relied upon a tribal 
council in which no individual chief had 
any power to conduct negotiations and 
enter treaties without the approval of said 
was haughty and insult-
ing. He continually addressed the Seminole 
negotiators as if they were the President's 
children or court appointed wards. After he 
was killed, on the same day as Dade's force 
was eliminated, Alligator declared that the 
warriors danced around his hung scalp and 
mocked his language and mannerisms. He 
would no longer insult anyone.s 
Without belaboring the complex origins 
of this most brutal war, it is worth noting 
that the white lust for land, cattle and oth-
er property was a major driving force to-
ward war. Recent work by historian Ronald 
Satz indicates the constant problems that 
arose with the initiation of the Indian Re-
moval Act and the bureaucracy it created. 
The lack of staff in Washington to oversee 
the Indian Agents, often corrupt political 
appointees, the insufficient funding of the 
removal by Congress, the parsimonious 
allotments for the military establishment 
assigned to carry out this policy and the 
overall planning deficiencies of the govern-
ment all helped to create an impossible 
situation. Many of these difficulties began 
long before Andrew Jackson became presi-
dent but they did not improve with his, and 
subsequent, administrations.6 From the 
initial confusion over supplying the Indians 
in Florida, through the contract with Ben-
jamin Chaires, to the insensitive adminis-
tration of Wiley Thompson, the policy of 
removal in Florida was replete with errors, 
confusion and corruption. The final out-
break of war was not a surprise to anyone. 
In 1823, the Treaty of Moultrie Creek 
decided the ultimate fate of the Seminoles 
and the other Native Americans living in 
Florida. Their final fate was to be removal 
but for the beginning of United States occu-
pation of Florida, a reservation was decided 
upon and surveyed by James Gadsden. 
This army officer had earlier recommended 
the Tampa Bay area as an ideal position 
from which to control any possible foreign 
influences upon the Seminoles and their 
cohorts. 7 Tampa Bay was ideal from Gads-
den's point of view because "The Indians 
have long been in the habit of keeping up an 
intercourse and active trade with the 
Cuban fishermen, and to this cause, princi-
pally, has been ascribed the encouragement 
hitherto given to absconding negroes, and 
the savage depredations committed on cat-
tle, estates, &c. "8 This constant theme of 
interdicting trade between the Cuban fish-
ermen on the Florida coast and the Semi-
noles plays an important role in why Tampa 
Bay was chosen for the site of Fort Brooke. 
Gadsden's letter also introduces the prob-
lem of the escaped slaves that has been at 
the center of academic discussions con-
cerning the Seminole Wars. There can be 
no disputing the fact that this facet of 
Southern society was a major trigger for 
the Second Seminole War. With the found-
ing of Fort Brooke in 1824, and the arrival 
of the agent for dispersing the rations to the 
Seminoles, the stage was set for the events 
of 1836.9 
As noted above, the situation Captain 
Belton and the garrison at Fort Brooke was 
desperate. The Florida militia would be of 
little assistance in the defense of the area, 
so help could not be expected from this 
quarter either. By 1835, the militia situation 
in Florida was, at best, pathetic. Although 
Governor William P. Duval had requested 
240 muskets and 250 rifles for this force in 
1832, Florida had received only 198 obso-
lete firearms from the Federal Government. 
Assuming that the arms supplied to the 
militia was a guarantee of effective use was 
beyond reality. The reality was that the 
militia of Florida, even with the arms pro-
vided by the government or from personal 
ownership, was neither large enough to 
handle the situation at hand nor effectively 
trained in the basic elements of military 
drill, use of firearms or tactics. At the out-
break of the war, there was not one regis-
tered gunsmith in the entire Territory.IO 
Belton could not and did not expect any 
help from this source. 
After learning of the fate of Dade's 
command, Captain Belton had to quickly 
assemble a resourceful defense. On January 
2, 1836, he took the friendly Indians 
camped outside of the stockade into the 
service of the United States. This force 
numbered about ninety to one hundred 
men and would be used to threaten or 
attack the rear of the enemy. As it was 
impossible for emigration of the Indians to 
take place under the circumstances, the 
captain felt these friendly Indians would be 
of "infinite service" to the post.11 Three 
days later, Belton wrote to W.C. Bolton, 
then commanding at Pensacola, "This place 
is now invested by all the Florida Indians in 
the Field with a large force of Negroes, par-
ticularly from the plantations of Tomoka & 
Smyrna, as appears from the examination 
of a prisoner just taken." The captain con-
tinued: "The fleet of transports . . . are of 
course, in alarm, & without arms & subject 
to an attack, & as far as I can judge, from 
the flanking movements of the Indians, 
down the bay, they intend either an attack 
on the island between the Transports & this 
post, where the friendly Indians families are 
posted, till they can be shipped." Belton 
concluded his letter declaring: "We have no 
communication with any post in Florida & I 
am of the opinion that 7500 men could not 
force it at present." He then requested of 
Bolton all the arms and men he could spare 
for the defense of Fort Brooke.12 In a sec-
ond letter to Bolton, Belton stated: "We are 
prepared for the most desperate assault 
they can make, inspirited as they are by the 
action at Withlacoochee on the 28th. "13 
While Belton was worried about facing the 
entire Seminole nation and its allies at 
Tampa, Governor John Eaton and General 117 
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Drawing of Fort Brooke, ca. 1825. (Courtesy of the P.K. 
Youn,ge Library of Florida History, Special Collections, 
Smathers Libraries, Unitlef"Sity of Florida.) 
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Richard K. Call were writing out their notes 
on recent events. Eaton addressed his letter 
to Secretary of War Lewis Cass on the 7th of 
January: "Our troops & the Indians ( 400 in 
number) have had a fight on the bank of the 
Amaxura river [Withlacoochee's old name]. 
The loss of the Indians is about fifty - no 
prisoners. The battle lasted for an hour, 
Gen'l Clinchs regulars are the principal suf-
ferers. Fifty or sixty are wounded & five or 
six killed." The governor then erroneously 
stated that Wiley Thompson had died in 
this battle, demonstrating the problems of 
communication during war on the fron-
tier.14 Call wrote to Eaton on the same day 
noting: "The precise strength of the enemy 
has not been ascertained. It is variously es-
timated by men of intelligence to be from 
1200 to 2000." The General continued:" ... 
all the Plantations South of Tampa were 
destroyed. . . . They have raised the Toma-
hawk in despair, they are waging a war of 
extermination and the Safety of our fellow 
citizens requires that not a moment should 
be lost in carrying the war into their own 
country." Call also observed that the coun-
try favored the Indians' style of warfare and 
that an army of 2,500 to 3,000 should be 
immediately sent to the field.IS Captain 
Belton, from his isolation in Tampa, could 
do nothing to prevent the destruction of the 
plantations south of his position. 
Governor Eaton, on the 9th of January, 
wrote again to Cass hoping for more rapid 
action from that quarter. He once more 
related the necessity of disbanding the 
Spanish fishing ranchos in southern Florida 
where, he charged, "no doubt aid & encour-
age the Indians, under their fishing pre-
text. "16 Yet, Captain Belton says little at 
this juncture about Spanish assistance to 
the Indians. He did not, however, remain 
idle and penned up in his stockade. On the 
12th of January, he led a command out of 
the post and toward the end of the day cap-
tured one Indian. This prisoner was from 
the Peace River encampment and provided 
Belton with some information he hitherto 
had not possessed. The Indian informed the 
captain that there had been an additional 
battle fought between the Miccosukees and 
the militia on the Alachua prairie (Paynes' 
Prairie) and that the whites had fled the 
field [which was substantially correct]. He 
also opined that another engagement had 
taken place on the Santa Fe River but 
offered no specifics. The same prisoner also 
declared that the Miccosukees were sup-
posed to have attacked Fort Brooke the 
previous evening, but did not. Belton then 
informed Roger Jones, adjutant general 
of the army, that he was affixing bayonets 
to poles stuck in the ground and covering 
them with twigs and leaves in the hopes 
of breaking up any direct assault on the 
fort.17 Belton was taking no chances and 
doing the best job possible under trying 
circumstances. 
Over in Havana harbor, Commander A. 
J. Dallas also heard the news. As comman-
der of the United States West Indies 
Squadron he had the responsibility to take 
charge of any demands made upon him for 
the defense of the country. He immediately 
went into action. After ordering all the 
marines he could spare from the fleet to 
Tampa Bay, and a detachment of seamen 
from the fleet to look after the light house at 
Cape Florida, he headed toward Key West 
in his flagship, the Constellation.18 By the 
17th of January the marines were on the 
way to Fort Brooke where they would assist 
the army and the Territory of Florida until 
August of 1836.19 The immediate need was 
not just for the fleet vessels of the squadron 
but also shallow draught vessels of the Rev-
enue Service to reach closer to land and 
penetrate up Florida's shallow waterways. 
At the behest of Governor Eaton and Terri-
torial Delegate Joseph White, the Treasury 
Department was prevailed upon to order its 
valuable cutters to aid in the military effort. 
The cutters Dexter, Washington and Dallas 
were soon doing yeoman's service and pro-
viding much needed relief to coastal inhab-
itants and the army.20 Again, one of the 
missions of the cutters was to intercept any 
trade between the Spanish fishermen, Cuba 
and the Indians.21 Belton was much appre-
ciative of the sending of the marines and 
the arrival of the cutters because he had 
discovered a plan to attack the fort by the 
combined forces of Micanopy, Osceola, and 
Little Cloud. The arrival of the marines may 
have been the deciding factor in why this 
attack did not materialize.22 
Governor Eaton was also seeking rein-
forcements for the beleaguered station and 
had even suggested that the army begin a 
campaign from Tampa moving down the 
western side of the peninsula. At the same 
time he offered the concept of sending 
troops to Charlotte Harbor and rescuing the 
inhabitants there, and then sending an 
additional force up the Peace or Myacca 
Rivers in a sort of pincer movement to cut 
off the Indians in that area. In addition to 
the inhabitants of the fisheries in Charlotte 
Harbor, there was also a customs collector, 
Dr. Crews, and his family stationed there. 
Crews had already been a few years on the 
job at the time of the outbreak and knew 
most of the local Indian and Spanish fisher-
men. So far removed from any type of mil-
itary force, he was in immediate danger and 
Charlotte Harbor was more isolated than 
Tampa Bay. It was thought that Eaton's sug-
gested plan of operations would crush the 
Indians on the west coast and save the in-
habitants and collector at the same time.23 
The arrival of the marines under Lieu-
tenant N.S. Waldron was one of the more 
important events in forestalling an attack 
by the Seminoles and their allies. With de-
tachments from the Constellation and the 
St. Louis, it was an obvious signal that oth-
er troops were on the way. Arriving aboard 
the Vandalia and the other transports, this 
force greatly augmented the numbers visi-
ble to spies. The Vandalia remained in the 
harbor, too, which added an imposing spec-
tacle for the attackers to contemplate.24 
With the almost daily arrival of supplies 
from the numerous transports the Seminole 
leadership was quick to realize that other 
troops and ships would soon be in the area. 
The obvious build up of men and materiel 
could only mean one thing to this enlight-
ened group, it was time to rethink their 
stn1tegy. 
The obvious landing of the forces of 
General Edmund P. Gaines at Fort Brooke 
probably signified the end of any real dan-
ger to the fort and nearby settlers. However, 
his landing almost did away with the post! 
In a letter to Captain Thomas Webb, com-
mander of the Vandalia, Gaines outlined 
his immediate plans. In this letter of Febru-
ary 10, 1836, Gaines proposed using the 
marines and crews of the navy to transfer 
the men, inhabitants and Indians from the 
post to the empty transport ships in 
the harbor for better security. He asked the 
captain if he would allow this action to take 
place under the protective guns of his proud 
ship. Gaines was contemplating using the 
entire garrison force, including the 
marines, to go to the relief of the forces at 
Fort Drane (Clinch's partially fortified 
plantation home in northern Marion 
County).25 Gaines was still thinking of 
abandoning the post on the 13th of 
February when Captain Webb notified 
Dallas of the proposal. With the arrival of 
the Louisiana Volunteers under General 
Persifor Smith, the need for the garrison 
troops was lessened and it may be pre-
sumed that this arrival saved the fort for the 
time being.26 
As word of the Seminole attacks in 
Florida reached the rest of the nation, the 
people of the neighboring and other south-
ern states began to volunteer for service in 
Florida. These fresh troops were under few 
illusions as to the nature of the enemy. In 
its January 29, 1836 edition, the prominent 
National Intelligencer noted the tenacity of 
the Seminoles and their allies: "The Indians 
themselves, heretofore a conquered people, 
and from whose energy no danger was ap-
prehended, have been profiting from the 
false security of the whites. Gaining experi-
ence from past defeats, and putting into 
exercise their whole skill and resources, 
have on a sudden started up a courageous 
and determined host." The paper continued 
in noting the tactics of the Seminoles: "Nor 
have these rude sons of the forest displayed 
any want of skill or foresight; on the con-
trary, they have manifested a wary dissimu-
lation, celerity of movement, courage in at-
tacking and a skill in retreating, subversive 
of all our military plans. "27 This wily enemy 
of white civilization lay in wait for the vol-
unteers from South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Alabama, Georgia and the District of Co-
lumbia. The nation was also getting ready to 
send in one of its finest generals, Winfield 
Scott, a true hero of the War of 1812. 
Gaines' force soon left Tampa Bay and 
headed toward the Withlacoochee where it 
would meet with great difficulty and be res-
cued by the very forces it had come to 
relieve. At the same time, General Winfield 
Scott was amassing a large force of regulars 
and volunteers for a push from the eastern 
portion of the Territory in an elaborate plan 
to entrap the Seminoles in a three-pronged 
pincer movement. In early March, Colonel 
William Lindsay, Second Artillery, arrived 
in camp and proceeded to organize for the 
coming campaign. Sent by Scott to move 
his troops, the marines and a large contin-
gent of Alabama volunteers northward 
toward the Cove of the Withlacoochee, 
Lindsay had difficulty from the beginning. 
By the 13th of March, the column had 
begun to move out toward the final staging 121 
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Chart of Tampa showing Fort Brooke at the mouth of the Hillsborough River in the top right. 
(Courtesy of the National Archi'Ves Microfilm Collection.) 
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area, Chocachatti (near modem Brooks-
ville). On the way, Lindsay decided to con-
struct a post closer to their line of march 
and ordered the building of Fort Alabama 
(later the site of Fort Foster). Arriving too 
late, and wasting time and energy firing 
guns and scouting the area, the force never 
made its rendezvous and turned around 
and headed back to Tampa on the 31st of 
March. They fought one major skirmish 
along the way, but accomplished very little 
except an almost continual quarreling 
among the volunteers and Colonel Lindsay. 
This was indicative of what would happen 
to other grand plans during this war.28 
By mid-March 1836, the forces of the 
United States Army and Navy were working 
to expand their knowledge of the area and to 
send out several reconnaissance missions. 
One of the earliest was led by U.S. Navy 
Lieutenant Levin M. Powell, who led a 
detachment of twenty-five men to the 
shores of the Manatee River. The mission 
discovered no Indians at the alleged camp, 
but did see signs of recent activity including 
a large number of foot prints and cattle 
tracks. All seemed headed toward the area 
of Sarasota Bay or further south.29 By the 
end of the month, the command at Tampa 
Bay was confident enough to send Lieu-
tenant Powell with a force from the 
Vandalia northward to the Anclote River 
after reexamining the Manatee River to the 
head of boat navigation. Most of the islands 
between the Manatee River and the Anclote 
River were explored for recent signs, but, 
again, they found nothing. Powell attributed 
the lack of signs on the Anclote Islands 
to their distance from the mainland, 
which made them difficult to access.30 The 
Seminoles and their allies had apparently 
fled inland to await their next battle. 
Charlotte Harbor was examined at the 
end of March by the U. S. Revenue cutter 
Washington, under the command of Cap-
tain Ezekiel Jones. The command fell in 
with a number of Indians camped at the 
mouth of the Myacca River. About twenty-
two Indians were seen in one body by the 
boat under Lieutenant Smith and numer-
ous fires were seen in the distance. The two 
guides, both from Bunce's fishing ranchos, 
proceeded ahead of the main body of men 
and met with three of the "hostile" party. 
They soon recognized each other and en-
tered into a parley. The two intrepid guides 
could not, however, ascertain the numbers 
or size of the other encampments without 
giving themselves away as enemy spies.JI 
On April 2nd, Lieutenant Powell left the 
Vandalia and proceeded to some of the 
islands in Charlotte Harbor. Here Powell, 
"found the inhabitants flying in every direc-
tion to escape the fury of the Indians." Up-
on examination of the collector's house, he 
found it burnt to the ground and no sign of 
Dr. Crews or his family. Sailing Master 
Stephen C. Rowan was then dispatched to 
the nearest mainland and came upon some 
of those responsible for the destruction. 
Rowan immediately attacked this band and 
reported killing two and taking one captive. 
The others escaped into the nearby woods 
where Rowan's small force dared not go.32 
The report filed by Lieutenant Powell indi-
cates that the inhabitants of "Josepa" Island 
were those he helped to rescue from the 
clutches of Wy-ho-kee and his band.JJ 
Captain M.P. Mix of the U.S.S. Concord 
wrote on the 30th of April that there were 
still some inhabitants left at Charlotte Har-
bor and that little protection could be of-
fered them as the closest units were thirty 
miles away. He also wrote to A.J. Dallas 
that: "The Indians are assembling in all di-
rections with a determination, as they 
threaten, to destroy all of the fisheries in 
the Bay and to bum the Transports at an-
chor in Hillsboro Harbor, or such of them as 
may remain after the departure of the vol-
unteers." Mix was concerned that the troop 
strength and the condition of the stockade 
made it possible, in his opinion, for the In-
dians to succeed. Mix also noted that Gen-
eral Scott had requested that the Concord 
remain at anchor in the harbor and that 
Lieutenant Waldron's marines also stay 
aboard. He declared that a "state of anxi-
ety" existed at Tampa Bay for want of 
knowledge of the next moves by the Semi-
noles and their allies. Such a state of anxi-
ety was probably unfounded but it is very 
understandable given the successes of the 
Indians in resisting the United States' best 
generalship. 
The high tensions at Tampa Bay were 
likely to be increased as the news from two 
other borders reached the area. In Texas, 
the revolution for independence was draw-
ing much of the national press interest and 
there was daily discussion as to the role of 
the United States in that conflict. Many 
were in favor of sending regular troops into 
the foray and committing the navy to a full 
time blockade of Mexico. Regular voyages 
were undertaken by the navy to gather 
information and keep a watchful eye on the 
developments there. Most of these sailings 
came from the West Indies Squadron, thus 
drawing away needed naval strength from 
the Florida coasts. In the north, the revolt 
in Upper Canada also drew away some of 
the military attention and forces to guard 
against any problems arising there. This 
further depleted the military strength avail-
able to fight the Seminoles in Florida. As 
the total military might of the United States 
numbered less than ten thousand men at 
this time, any venture away from the center 
of action had possible dire consequences. 
Even after the scoutings of the Manatee 
River by the forces under Lieutenant Pow-
ell, rumors still persisted about a large force 
of "Indian negroes" on that waterway. Ac-
cording to the St. Augustine Florida Herald 
for April 23, 1836: "Three days ago two In-
dian negroes were taken - from one of 
whom information was obtained of a negro 
fort on the Manatee River, about 15 miles 
south of Tampa Bay. Gen. Eustis had taken 
up the line of march to attack. It was not 
known how many negroes are in the fort, 
but the negro stated there was a large num-
ber." Such gossip spread among the territo-
rial newspapers like a wild fire and added 
greatly to the anxieties of the population. 
In mid-April, General Persifor Smith of 
the Louisiana Volunteers and Captain Ross 
of the U. S. Marines came on board the Dal-
las to discuss the coming short campaign 
up the Myacca River, where the enemy had 
been previously reported. From April 12th 
to April 17th the men from the Vandalia, 
Dallas and other smaller vessels prepared 
for their adventure. For a while there was 
some hope that the enemy would be found 123 
124 
but after the troops' departure on the 18th 
of April, little could be expected. Dr. Crews' 
body, and that of his assistant, had been 
found and it was presumed that most of 
those responsible had already left the area. 
This was confirmed when General Smith 
and his forces returned with nothing much 
to show for their extended efforts. Accord-
ing to the Florida Herald for May 12, 1836, 
" ... there seems to be an opinion that the 
Indian captured by Lieut. Powell commit-
ted the outrage on Dr. Crews, as he was em-
ployed in the boat of Dr. C. and was heard 
to make threats to that effect previously."J4 
By the end of April Fort Brooke was be-
ginning to take on a familiar appearance. 
According to one writer, stationed at "Shel-
ton Camp, (16 miles from Tampa Bay)," the 
fort was a breath of fresh air: "Tampa is a 
beautiful place, with orange and pride of In-
dia trees in blossom, the sight of which was 
reviving to us thirsty travelers in the desert. 
The air acted on my lungs like exhilarating 
gas."35 John Erwin of the Tennessee volun-
teers also observed the fort: "Fort Brooke 
situated on Tampa Bay was a military post 
of considerable importance as it was situat-
ed within the hollow of a curve in the bay it 
was three parts out of the four surrounded 
by water, its watch towers and sentinel 
could be seen a mile before reaching it, our 
camp was one mile north of the fort." Erwin 
also raved about the abundance of oysters 
nearby which he claimed made his men 
"better and fatter immediately."36 These 
observations differ significantly from those 
recorded by earlier visitors prior to the 
change in location. The old fort, at the time 
of the earliest expeditions against the Semi-
noles, was described by W.F. Rowles, sur-
geon for the Creek Volunteers. Writing in 
the Southron magazine in 1841, the doctor 
recalled: "The appearance of Fort Brooke 
during the stay of the Creeks was singularly 
animating. The Barracks and store houses 
are built facing the bay and the river Hills-
boro, and present long rows of low com-
bustible shanties, some of them white-
washed and neatly paled in with old staves 
of barrels, tierces, &c. It was amusing," he 
continued, "to see the taste and ingenuity 
of our officers exerted in such a place, with 
such means, to make their quarters com-
fortable. The post was guarded by a circle of 
sentinels. The underbrush cut down for 
some rods towards the forest and beyond 
the Hillsboro." He too noted the watch tow-
ers and added that many of the tents were 
lining the old streets among the orange 
trees. Numerous cannon were to be seen 
pointing "ominously toward all the ap-
proaches. "37 Alexander B. Meek noted in 
his journal the existence of the famed Live 
Oak trees and the numerous orange trees 
on the grounds. He compared it favorably to 
"an ornamental college green" and declared 
the post impregnable against any possible 
Indian attack.38 It should be remembered 
that most of the small settlement had been 
destroyed to create an open field of fire for 
the garrison. The settlement contained 
about thirty or forty families, all of whom 
were considered quite poor.39 
The beginning of May brought on sick-
ness and it was reported that Fort Brooke 
was no exception. According to the Nation-
al Intelligencer for May 6, 1836, "There was 
400 sick at Tampa Bay, and the climate was 
getting worse and worse for the Army." This 
report came on the heels of the Battle of 
Thonotosassa. Here the forces sent back to 
Fort Alabama to remove materiel and 
equipment were fired upon by the Semi-
noles while attempting to cross Thonotosas-
sa Creek. It was the hardest fighting any of 
General Scott's forces faced in their time in 
Florida. Members of the Fourth Infantry 
and the Second Artillery were joined by the 
Alabama Volunteers under Colonel William 
Chisolm in a very spirited battle in which 
two whites were killed and twenty-five 
wounded (the majority of them from the 
volunteer ranks). The loss to the Seminoles 
and their allies is unknown. The fight lasted 
about an hour and ended with a charge with 
fixed bayonets by the regulars and volun-
teers. The battle also featured the use of 
cannon to some effect, an unusual occur-
rence in this war. The Indians had chosen 
their position well. It was on a curve in the 
creek lined with dense hammocks. The first 
fire, as is common in such battles, caused 
the most damage to the U.S. forces. The 
men then retired to Fort Brooke to recoup 
and refurbish themselves. 40 
May of 1836 not only signaled the onset 
of the "rainy season," but it also saw the be-
ginning of the agitation to remove the 
marines back to Pensacola and other naval 
assignments. Major Henry Wilson, then 
commanding the fort, refused to release 
Waldron's marine detachment for other 
duties. He felt strongly that the security of 
the post would be compromised if the 
_, 
.., 
I 
' . 
~. 
\ 
.~ 
r...,.~ 
\ 
I 
.~ 
,. 
,, 
" 
..l:J4)' 
~· .. 
. . 
" . \ : .. 
·.; ... . 
.. : .. 
"'· 
....... , 
.... 
' 
-l 
I 
I 
Map of Tampa and Hillsborough Bay, showing Fort Brooke in the center at the mouth of the 
Hillsborough River.(Courtesy of the National Archi'Ves Microfilm Collection.) 
marines left at this juncture. Captain Mix, 
of the Concord, disagreed with this assess-
ment. Mix noted that there was a relative 
lull in activity for the marines and that 
much of their time was spent guarding 
William Bunce's rancho at the mouth of the 
bay. Wilson was waiting for either rein-
forcements or replacements for Lieutenant 
Waldron's valuable force. Until such time as 
either of these alternatives arrived, the ma-
jor was not about to release the marines. 
[They did not leave until August of 1836.)41 
One of the more humanitarian gestures 
found in this period of activity involved the 
removal of the families around Sarasota 
Bay, known locally as the Caldes Rancho. 
On May 8th, Lieutenant Charles P. Childs of 
the revenue cutter Washi~ton was ordered 
to sail to Sarasota Bay and confer with "Old 
Caldes" or his son. He was to convey to 
them the danger to which they were ex-
posed and advise them to move to either 
Tampa or to Bunce's Rancho were they 
could be afforded protection. The settlers 
were not eager to leave their homes and 
were afraid that the army would separate 
the families because many of the wives 
were Indian. Many residents of the settle-
ment had already departed when Childs 
arrived; he did, however, observe about 
twenty individuals living there at that time. 
All were busy loading canoes, which were 
filled to capacity, and were riding low in the 
water. The only thing preventing the final 
departure was the weather. 42 
Early June found the army clearing out 
the ever growing shrubs and weeds from the 
open area. Making the post more inhabit-
able by larger numbers was also on the 
agenda of the officers. Gardens which had 
been neglected had to be tended and some 
of the early crops harvested. In addition, 125 
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three advanced redoubts were constructed 
at this time. Colonel Lindsay and his force 
were ordered on to Mobile, and his depar-
ture was met with approval by many in 
camp, especially the remaining troops from 
Alabama. The only Indian activity reported 
in early June was that of a few raiding par-
ties who stole a number of cattle during 
night raids. But it was the sickness that 
worried Major Wilson, and he observed that 
the post had only one assistant surgeon, Dr. 
Reynolds. If this one medical officer should 
become ill, the remainder of the post would 
suffer. Like other shortages in the officer 
band and others had to be accounted for 
and rations distributed. Funding and ra-
tions for the "suffering inhabitants" also 
had to be allotted to the settlers seeking 
refuge in the area. One of the more emo-
tionally difficult tasks remained to be ac-
complished; the selling of the effects of the 
soldiers killed in Dade's last battle and set-
tling the debts of the officers, like Captain 
G.W. Gardiner. The proceeds from the sale 
of the effects usually went into the compa-
ny fund handled by the company comman-
der, but receipted through the paymaster 
general of the army. 45 Such tasks were not 
corps, the lack of med-
ical officers was a severe 
handicap for the army 
serving in remote areas. 
Wilson requested a sec-
ond medical officer for 
the post, however, the 
post did not receive one 
while he was in com-
mand. 43 
One of the more 
emotionally difficult 
tasks remained to be 
accomplished; the selling 
of the effects of the s 
welcomed by anyone in 
the company. 
Fort Brooke and the 
settlements near Tam-
pa Bay were relatively 
safe from the attacks of 
the Seminoles artd their 
allies at the end of the 
first campaigns. The 
war had already seen 
the defeats of armies 
under Generals Clinch, 
Call, Gaines and Scott. 
Waiting in the future 
were the terms of Gen-
erals Thomas Jesup, 
Zachary Taylor, Walker 
Armistead and William 
Jenkins Worth. Six 
more years of guerrilla 
warfare remained ahead 
for the army, navy, 
marines and volunteers. 
The Second Seminole 
War was to be the long-
est continually fought 
and most expensive of 
oldiers killed in Dade's 
The usual diseases of 
the Florida summer hit 
the troops hard. The 
various fevers, "bilious," 
"black vomit" and inter-
mittent, played havoc 
on the health of the 
army and navy. The vol-
unteers also suffered 
from the climate. 
Colonel John Warren 
commanded the Second 
Military District for the 
Florida Militia and re-
ported, on June 9th, an 
outbreak of the "mease-
les" among his troops.44 
This is no longer a seri-
last battle and settling the 
debts of the officers, like 
Captain G. W. Gardiner. 
The proceeds from the 
sale of the effects usually 
went into the company 
fund handled by the 
company commander, but 
receipted through the 
Paymaster General of the 
Army. 45 Such tasks were 
not welcomed by anyone 
in the company. 
ous disease in this day and age, but it was 
deadly to the frontier settlers and military 
personnel. Mumps, too, made their appear-
ance in Florida in the 1830s but did not 
reach Tampa Bay. The army, because of the 
fevers' appearance in the summer months 
and the deadly affects it had on the troops, 
seldom campaigned in the "rainy season" in 
Florida. Not until Colonel William J. Worth 
took command in 1841 did Florida see a 
summer campaign. 
The rainy season did bring on new ad-
ministrative tasks for the commander and 
garrison at Fort Brooke. Money for the em-
igration of the Seminoles of Black Dirt's 
all of the wars the Unit-
ed States fought with its Native Americans. 
This war brought glory to none of the politi-
cal or military leaders and played a role in 
the increasing agitation against slavery, just 
then beginning in the northern portion of 
the nation. The panic and terror in the 
Tampa Bay area during the first six months 
of the war subsided into a near routine of 
shuffling the troops into and out of the ter-
ritory and seeing to the emigration of most 
of the Seminoles, blacks and Miccosukees 
to the west. Those who survived those first 
months of the war never forgot them. It was 
a time to try the souls of all men, women 
and children of both sides. 
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